There is a widespread belief that disasters cause looting, theft, violence, and a breakdown of social order. However, decades of social research challenge this view. Henry Quarantelli, a pioneer in the sociology of disasters, referred to this misconception as a “disaster myth.” In his 1994 paper, ‘Looting and Antisocial Behaviour in Disasters,’ he discusses why this belief persists. Journalists and inexperienced officials often speculate that disasters present an opportunity for crime, assuming that societal norms collapse under pressure and that survivors are easy prey for looters. During disasters, rumours of looting spread rapidly, with 70-90% of people in affected areas hearing such stories. However, instances of looting are extremely rare. Even social control agency officials often believe these tales, despite their own forces reporting no such activity. Media reports tend to emphasise looting or the deployment of security forces to prevent it, and even the absence of such incidents is considered newsworthy precisely because it defies expectations. In reality, when looting does occur, it is usually minimal.
Rather than violence and looting, disasters often lead to altruistic behaviour. As Drabek and Quarantelli note, disasters ‘often bring out the best in individuals’. People expand their existing social networks temporarily to include others in their area, forming communities of mutual support. Drury and colleagues describe how these communities are built on a sense of ‘common fate’, shared by those facing the same crisis, which fosters a sense of social identity. These communities play a crucial role during the emergency phase, as it is often ordinary citizens who undertake the majority of the rescue and support efforts, as Kathleen Tierney has highlighted. In her book, A Paradise Built in Hell, Rebecca Solnit describes these temporary communities of mutual support. She explores five different disasters and shows that people generally respond with altruism, solidarity, and mutual aid. They form temporary networks of mutual support to get through the crisis. Uekusa and colleagues refer to these networks as "disaster social capital". These networks are generally more inclusive than people’s pre-existing social networks. In 1938, Margaret Wood noted that social distances become less pronounced during the emergency phase of a disaster, a phenomenon she referred to as the "democracy of distress". For a short period, many people imagine that they are “all in this together” and connect to some extent across social divides.
However, this sense of solidarity is often short-lived. Wealthier individuals, who are typically better connected to other affluent people and power holders, tend to receive more external assistance and receive it sooner. This allows them to withdraw from the temporary communities of mutual support. Henry Quarantelli notes that, once the emergency phase passes and recovery begins, antisocial and criminal behaviour becomes more apparent. Examples include fraudulent claims for damages, misappropriation of relief supplies, and contractors failing to deliver promised services. However, these issues tend to arise during the recovery phase rather than the immediate emergency response.
It is important not to romanticise the temporary communities that form during disasters. While these groups are generally more inclusive than pre-existing social networks, many people can still find themselves partially excluded. Factors such as mobility issues, living remotely, and language barriers mean that not everybody has the same ability to link up. Media coverage can also perpetuate racial and other stereotypes, framing some as more ‘deserving’ victims than others and leading to uneven support. Uekusa and colleagues argue therefore that disaster social capital does not benefit everyone equally.
Furthermore, disaster social capital may not emerge in the first place, especially in communities characterised by distrust, division, and a lack of civic participation. Quarantelli noted that although antisocial behaviour is rare during disasters, it is more likely in communities with high levels of social inequality, concentrated disadvantage, elevated crime rates, ineffective or corrupt policing, and ongoing social tensions. Disasters do not transform the underlying issues that lead to high crime and violence. The persistence of these ‘regular’ criminal patterns might be wrongly perceived as disaster-induced, although the disaster itself may have little impact on crime rates. In fact, violent crimes typically do not increase during disasters and standard crimes often decrease during the emergency phase of disasters.
In communities were disaster social capital does emerge, communities pull together and display prosocial, rather than antisocial, behaviour. Under those conditions, disasters tend to unleash altruism rather than criminality. Therefore, effective disaster risk reduction should focus on improving relationships within communities and with authorities, and on strengthening the socio-economic standing of marginalised groups. As Uekusa and colleagues note, these actions can make it more likely for disaster social capital to develop and for its benefits to be more equitably distributed.
References:
Drabek, T.E. & Quarantelli E.L. (1967) Scapegoats, villains and disasters’. Trans-action, 4, 12–17.
Drury, J. et al. (2019) Facilitating collective psychosocial resilience in the public in emergencies: twelve recommendations based on the social identity approach. Frontiers in Public Health. 7(141), 1–21.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1994). Looting and antisocial behaviour in disasters. In Disasters, Collective Behaviour, and Social Organization, edited by Russell R. Dynes and Kathleen J. Tierney, University of Delaware Press.
Solnit, R. (2010). A paradise built in hell: The extraordinary communities that arise in disaster. Penguin.
Tierney, K. (2003) Disaster beliefs and institutional interests: recycling disaster myths in the aftermath of 9–11. In L. Clarke (ed.) Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas. Elsevier, New York, NY. pp. 33–51
Uekusa, S., Matthewman, S., & Lorenz, D. F. (2022). Conceptualising disaster social capital: what it is, why it matters, and how it can be enhanced. Disasters, 46(1), 56-79.
Wood, M. M., (1938) Comments on ‘The sociology of crises: the Louisville flood of 1937’ by Kutak, R.I. (author) Social Forces. 16, 66–72.
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